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applied by the trial court, are unconstitutionally 
overbroad to the extent that the procedural provisions of 
the Act serve to limit claims against a special 
classification, as opposed the achievement of the stated 
legislative intent to "provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.'' 
State v. Framoton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987); Berrv bv and 
through Berrv v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985). [R. 157-161, 163, 204-205, 257, pp. 19-20, 23, 
27-31.] A challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute presents only questions of law, and the trial 
court's rulings are accorded no particular deference. 
Rvan v. Gold Cross Servs. . Inc., 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1995); Mountain Fuel SUTDOIV v. Salt Lake Citv, 752 P.2d 
884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
III. Whether or not the plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights under Article I, sections 2, 7, 11 and 24 and 
Article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution 
were violated by (1) Utah Administrative Rules, Rule 
R156, (2) the Division's action in deciding not to open 
2 
and process a file with regard to the Notice of Intent 
and Petition, (3) the Division's failure to provide 
notice to parties of its decision and actions, and (4) 
such other action of the Division as should be required 
by Utah Code Ann. , Sections 78-14-2 and 78-14-12 so as to 
not make Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-12 
unconstitutionally overbroad and to otherwise avoid 
arbitrarily depriving the plaintiff's of their rights of 
due process and access to the courts. State v. Frampton, 
737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987); Berrv bv and through Berrv v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Soackman Ex Rel 
Soackman v. Bd. Of Educ. , 16 P. 3d 533 (Utah 2000); Morris 
v. Public Service Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah). [R. 
157-161, 163, 204-205, 257, pp. 19-20, 23, 27-31.] With 
respect to an appeal which presents only questions of 
law, the trial court's rulings are accorded no deference 
and are reviewed for correctness. Mountain Fuel Supply 
v. Salt Lake Citv, 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-12. 
Utah Administrative Code, Rules R156-78A. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The above-captioned action involves claims of 
negligence and wrongful death against medical care 
providers of Norma Mary Harriman. 
Following filing of the action in Third District 
Court, the case was dismissed. Based on matters 
considered outside the pleadings, the t r i a l court 
addressed the matter under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56 as a motion for summary judgment. The t r i a l 
court found that i t did not have jurisdiction over the 
case as a consequence of the provisions of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act (the wAct"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Norma Mary Harriman died on or about March 3, 1999. 
On or about February 14, 2001, her heirs filed a Notice 
of Intent to Commence Legal Action (the "Notice of 
Intent") and a Petition for Prelitigation Review (the 
*Petition") with the Utah Division of Occupational 
Licensing (the "Division") pursuant to the Act. The 
Notice of Intent was sent by certified mail to all of the 
4 
applicable medical care providers. The Petition was not 
sent to the named parties, as none of them had yet been 
served in the action with the Division. [R. 26-35.] 
No action was taken by the Division. [R. 73-75.] 
The Division made a conscious decision (1) not to notify 
the parties of the opening of a file relative to the 
Notice of Intent, (2) not to notify the parties that it 
had not received a copy of the Petition (or that it was 
lost), (3) not to notify the parties of any requirements 
of maintaining the action commenced by the filing of the 
Notice of Intent, (4) not to notify the parties of its 
decision to close the action commenced by the filing of 
the Notice of Intent, and (5) and not to provide for any 
remedy or procedure associated with the foregoing, 
whether by including the same in Rule R156-78A of the 
Utah Administrative Rules or informally, so as not to 
arbitrarily fail to accomplish the intent of Utah Code 
Ann., section 78-14-2 or Rule R156-78A to provide a 
process to "expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims," which is the only role of the Division and the 
5 
only purpose of filing a Notice of Intent or Petition. 
[R. 73-75, ] 
The plaintiffs filed an action in Third District 
Court on June 13, 2001, alleging negligence and wrongful 
death against the medical care providers. 
At the hearing held December 19, 2001, the Trial 
Court held that the failure to mail a copy of the 
Petition to the named defendants deprived the Trial Court 
of Jurisdiction. [R. 257.] Pursuant to said decision, on 
February 4, 2002, the Trial Court executed an Order of 
Dismissal. [R. 245-48.] Notice of Appeal was filed March 
4, 2002. [R. 249-50.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When a case falls under the Act, the courts in the 
state of Utah are not thereby deprived of jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction with the Division is concurrent, until the 
jurisdiction of the Division is expires pursuant to Act. 
As a condition precedent to commencement of 
litigation, a plaintiff must file a notice on intent to 
commence legal action and request a prelitigation panel 
review with the Division. Minor defects in the form of 
6 
the request for prelitigation panel review do not deprive 
the trial court of jurisdiction, and the Act actually 
provides that upon the expiration of the jurisdiction of 
the Division under the conditions of the present case 
that all prelitigation requirement shall be deemed 
satisfied. 
The stated purpose of the prelitigation panel review, 
as stated by the Act, is uto provide other procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims." Utah Code Ann., section 78-14-2. To the extent 
that the Act has been interpreted by the trial court as a 
mechanism to limit the filing of lawsuits against health 
care providers, the Act is unconstitutional because its 
effect is to deprive a classification of equal access to 
the courts and because it deprives claimants of due 
process in certain circumstances. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to constitutional protections 
in the administration of their claims by the Division. 
The Division deprived the plaintiffs in this case of 
their rights to due process and equal access to the 
courts. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I , THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION, 
The d i s t r i c t courts have j u r i s d i c t i o n over claims of 
negl igence and wrongful death pursuant t o Utah Code Ann., 
Sect ion 78-3-4. Nothing in the Act s t a t e s any l i m i t a t i o n 
on the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the d i s t r i c t c o u r t s . The Utah 
Supreme Court has held t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t cou r t may 
e x e r c i s e tha t j u r i s d i c t i o n , even when c e r t a i n procedural 
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s in the Act a r e no t fo l lowed in the 
a n t i c i p a t e d fashion. See Avila v . Winn, 794 P. 2d 20 
(Utah 1990) ( D i s t r i c t court had j u r i s d i c t i o n in ac t i on 
f i l e d p r i o r to completion of p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review) . 
With respec t to the p r e r e q u i s i t e s for f i l i n g a 
medical malpract ice lawsui t , the a p p e l l a t e cou r t s have 
i d e n t i f i e d (at l e a s t in d i c t a ) t h r e e r equ i r emen t s 
provided by the Act with which the p l a i n t i f f must comply 
or face dismissal of the a c t i o n . C a r t e r v . Milford 
Val ley Memorial HOSP. , 996 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 
2 00 0 ) ; Avila , supra ; Allen v . In t e rmoun ta in Health 
Care, I n c . , 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981). 
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First, the plaintiff must file a notice of intent to 
commence legal action (the "Notice") and serve a copy on 
the applicable health care providers. See Utah Code 
Ann. , Section 78-14-8. It is undisputed that each of the 
defendants was served with the notice of intent to 
commence an action and that the notice was filed with the 
Division of February 14, 2001. [R. 29-32.] 
Second, the plaintiff must file a request for 
prelitigation panel review (the "Request") . See Utah 
Code Ann., Section 78-14-12(2). The trial court found a 
question of fact as to whether or not the Request had 
been filed by the plaintiff. [R. 245.] As a result of 
consideration of evidence outside the pleadings, the 
trial court addressed the matter pursuant to Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, or in other words construing 
the matter as though the Request had been filed. Under 
circumstances where the Division convenes a prelitigation 
panel, the plaintiff must submit to the review by the 
panel. See Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-12(1); but see 
Utah Code Ann. , Section 7 8 - 14 - 12 ( 3 ) (b) ( ii ) (if 
prelitigation panel procedures not completed within 180 
9 
days of Request, then xxthe claimant is considered to have 
complied with all conditions precedent required under 
this section prior to the commencement of litigation"). 
The Division did not convene a prelitigation panel, and 
the plaintiff was thereby released from such requirement 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-12(3) (b) (ii) . 
Moreover, as a result of the failure of the Division to 
timely complete the prelitigation panel review process, 
plaintiffs are "considered to have complied with all 
conditions precedent required under this section prior to 
the commencement of litigation." Id. 
Third, the plaintiff must file the complaint with the 
district court within the abbreviated two-year statute of 
limitations period. Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-4. The 
complaint must be filed at least 90 days after service of 
the Notice. Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-8. Again, it 
is undisputed that the complaint was timely filed. The 
only dispute among the parties related to the Request. 
Based on the foregoing, it can only be concluded that 
the trial court had jurisdiction in the action. The 
trial court had the discretion to either proceed with 
10 
litigation or to provide the parties with an opportunity 
for a prelitigation panel review before proceeding, or 
otherwise address the circumstances of the parties. 
The trial court's finding that it had no jurisdiction 
because the Request was not mailed to the defendants at 
the time of filing was reversible error. The trial court 
took its decision from the language of the Act provided 
by Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-12 (2) (b) , which states 
in part, "The request shall be mailed to all health care 
providers named in the notice and request." There is no 
basis to conclude that such provision is by itself 
jurisdictional. As stated above, Utah Code Ann., Section 
78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii) renders the question moot. The only 
relevant question is whether the Request was filed with 
the Division. 
The parties refer to Utah Code Ann. , Section 78-14-
12(1) (c) for the proposition that "The proceedings are 
informal, nonbinding, ... but are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to commencing litigation." Yet, this 
provision refers to the conduct of proceedings arranged 
by the Division in response to a Request and not to the 
11 
technical accuracy of issues such as mailing the Request. 
Section 78-14-12 (3) (b) (ii) clearly implies that such 
technicalities are not jurisdictional. Moreover, the 
legislative intent of the proceedings is stated in 
Section 78-14-2 as "to provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." 
The implementing rules similarly provide in R156-78A-
4(1), "Liberal Construction. These rules shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
economical determination of all issues presented to the 
division. " The purpose of the statute and rules is not to 
limit medical malpractice claims through a mechanism that 
allows the Division to deprive claimants of their due 
process r ights. Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-12(1) 
makes i t the responsibility of the Division to promulgate 
rules to achieve the purposes stated. This Court has 
jurisdiction to find that either the appropriate rules or 
procedures are not in place or that the Division did not 
otherwise act as they should. As discussed below, the 
tr ial court 's interpretation of the purpose of the 
12 
statute as a mechanism for limiting claims is an 
unconstitutional interpretation. 
Because the trial court has jurisdiction, appellants 
respectfully request that the order dismissing their 
claims be reversed and that the matter be remanded to the 
trial court to determine how to proceed with reference to 
litigation and/or convening of a prelitigation panel. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE ACT 
VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS. 
The Utah Constitution provides guarantees in wrongful 
death cases, open access to the court for all citizens, 
equal protection and due process* Utah Constitution, and 
Article I, sections 2, 7, 11 and 24 and Article XVI, 
section 5- Similar due process rights are guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution. 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution is 
generally referred to as the "open courts" provision. 
Berrv bv and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 
670, 674 (Utah 1985). Among the purposes of Section 11 
is the guaranty of "access to the courts and a judicial 
13 
procedure based on fairness and equality." id. at 675. 
To satisfy the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution, legislation must be substantially equal in 
value or benefit to any remedy abrogated. .Id. at 680. If 
no substitute remedy is provided, abrogation of the 
remedy can only be justified if there is a clear social 
evil to be eliminated and elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of 
achieving the objective. Id. at 680. Defining the scope 
of Section 11 requires careful consideration of related 
constitutional issues, such as those of due process 
provided by Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Ld. at 680. These protections impose a 
limitation on powerful groups, such as medical care 
providers and insurance companies, from using the 
political process to limit the rights of other groups. 
See Id. at 676. 
Article XVI, section 5, of the Utah Constitution is 
intended to prevent abolition of the right of action for 
wrongful death, either in a wholesale or piecemeal 
fashion. Id. at 684. Application of Section 5 is 
14 
considerably more strict that the application of Section 
11. IcL at 683.1 Restrictions which limit the ability of 
a party to effectively pursue a remedy for wrongful death 
is "beyond legislative authority." id. at 684. If such 
action is beyond legislative authority, then it is 
certainly beyond the authority of the Division, under the 
guise of legislative authority, to produce the same 
effect. 
Another related constitutional issue involves 
substantive due process, guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution, and Article I, section 7 and by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. A 
statute may be overbroad in its application, and violate 
the interests of substantive due process, if its effect 
is to limit rights beyond an intended legitimate purpose. 
See e.g. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 191-192 (Utah 
1987) . 
1
 See Berry bv and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 
717 P. 2d 670, 683-85 for a discussion of statutes declared 
unconstitutional or constitutional with reference to 
Article XVI, section 5. 
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All of the foregoing rights do not depend upon or 
defer to the legislature, but must be upheld as resting 
upon constitutional authority that is supreme to the 
legislature. See STDackman Ex Rel Spackman v. Bd. Of 
Educ . , 16 P.3d 533, 535-36 (Utah 2000) (Article I, 
Section 7 is self executing clause) . 
At the hearing in question, the trial court 
specifically stated, "Well, but see, the rules of 
procedure really don't apply, do they? There are some 
standards that the legislature, right or wrong, has 
decided to give special treatment to health care 
providers. Whether you disagree with that or whether you 
don't, it's the law, and the Supreme Court says its 
constitutional, so you have got to jump through all of 
these hoops. It is like the notice on the governmental 
immunity act. There are certain things that you have got 
to do." 
The governmental immunity act, referred to the by the 
trial court, is a statute which provides parties with a 
right to sue certain government institutions in certain 
cases. Rather than limiting the rights of individuals to 
16 
commence litigation, i t creates a right of action when 
certain requirement are met. The Act, on the other hand, 
serves as a limitation on actions. It must have a 
purpose other than the arbitrary limitation of access to 
the courts of a certain classification of plaintiffs. 
The legislature certainly understood this when they 
stated that the purpose of the prelitigation panel 
review, as discussed above, was uto provide other 
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims" and not to limit actions against 
health care providers except by the statute of 
limitations imposed. The only limitation against filing 
actions which is provided by the Act that the Courts have 
confirmed is constitutional is the two-year statute of 
limitations. See Allen, supra. 
The t r ia l court further demonstrated its erroneous 
construction of the Act when i t stated, "That doesn't 
make sense. If the purpose of i t is to avoid filing 
lawsuits then why are we allowing-then why does the 
statute allow filing lawsuits in the middle of the 
prelitigation panel process." Again, the stated purpose 
17 
of the procedures involved in the prelitigation panel 
review process is to expedite the discussion of issues, 
not prevent Plaintiffs from going forward. 
The Act provides no remedy to a plaintiff, only a 
non-binding forum for discussion of claims. If a purpose 
of the Act is to eliminate lawsuits against providers of 
medical care, then the Act cannot stand. Lawsuits 
against negligent parties is not an evil to be eliminated 
in society, but is instead and important remedy for 
injuries, particularly in wrongful death cases. On the 
other hand, if the purpose of the Act is uto provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims," then the purpose is appropriate as 
long as the process does not have the unconstitutional 
effect of depriving parties of the right to bring an 
action in court, and as long as the Division and the 
courts adopt rules and administer the process with the 
purpose of early evaluation and settlement of claims in 
mind. If rules are adopted or administered, or if the 
Act is interpreted, in a fashion that eliminates claims 
without appropriate remedies for circumstances-- even 
18 
oversights — that may arise, then the effect of the Act 
becomes unconstitutional. 
In other words, any provision of the Act that were to 
make s t r ic t compliance with filing and mailing the 
Request jur isdic t ional , would cons t i tu te an 
unconstitutional limitation on due process and access to 
the courts for the applicable classification of 
plaintiffs. Unless the Act is interpreted in the manner 
suggested by the Appellants in this action, as requiring 
the Division and permitting the court to convene a 
prelitigation panel when a filing is lost or in the event 
of some other irregularity, then the Act is 
unconstitutional. 
In the present case, the circumstances involve the 
timely filing of the Notice with the Division, a Request 
which was filed with the Division and lost by the 
Division, and a Complaint that was timely filed in the 
District Court. The constitutional issues raised by the 
Appellants must be resolved in favor of permitting the 
Appellants to go forward as plaintiffs in this action. 
19 
The constitutionality of the Act as a limitation on 
the right of access to the courts, as well as the due 
process arguments concerning the Division addressed both 
above and below, are matters of first impression before 
this Court.2 
Ill, THE DIVISION VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
An act by a administrative body which is taken 
without notice to affected parties violates due process. 
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 321 P.2d 644 (Utah). 
The Division has a responsibility to parties that 
file a Notice and/or Request. First, the Division has 
2 Carter, supra, considered the interpretation of the 
term "health care provider" in the Act. Avila, supra, 
considered whether the district court had jurisdiction 
with regard to a prematurely filed complaint where 
irregularities existed with respect to the request for 
prelitigation panel review and the completion of such 
proceedings. The principles of estoppel in Avila, 
however, do have some application in the present case to 
the plaintiffs' reliance on the Division's silence. In 
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 1992) the Court 
addressed the necessity of filing an action within 60 days 
following the service of the Notice. The Court did not 
consider the necessity of a prelitigation panel review, 
under a prior version of the statute, because it held that 
the issue was precluded by collateral estoppel. In Allen, 
supra, the Court only addressed the constitutionality of a 
two year statute of limitations. 
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been given the authority and responsibility to adopt 
rules implementing the Act in order to achieve the stated 
purposes of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. . Section 78-14-
12(1). As discussed above, the purpose of the role 
played by the Division is uto provide other procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims." 
In the present case, the rules adopted by the 
Division are inadequate to protect the due process rights 
of claimants and their right of access to the courts. 
Even to the extent that the rules were adequate at some 
level, the policies and conduct of the Division, as 
described in the affidavit of Adele Bancroft, the 
prelitigation coordinator for the Division, dated July 
30, 2001, are not being followed so as to protect the 
constitutional rights of claimants. [R. 73-75.] 
Ms. Bancroft's affidavit seems to indicate that, as 
actually occurred in the present case, the Division has 
no procedure whatsoever for notification to claimants 
with regard to deficiencies in a file, including lost 
filings. She states, 
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8. If the Division had received a Request which was 
deficient for some reason, such as the failure to 
submit the approved fee, the Division would have 
denied the Request and would have a record of such 
denial. 
9. Because a Request was not filed with the 
Division and the required filing fee was not 
submitted to the Division, no action was taken or 
required to be taken by the Division in this matter, 
and no prelitigation review was approved. 
In her letter, dated July 12, 2001, Ms. Bancroft 
further stated, uIt is my policy to hold any Notice of 
Intent to Commence Legal Action that are received without 
the proper accompanying documents for 60 days. If the 
appropriate Request and filing fee are not received 
within that time, the matter is considered "dead" and 
filed." 
Ms. Bancroft makes no reference to any notice or due 
process procedures involving notification to the parties.3 
3 The court should note that Ms. Bancroft had no 
personal knowledge concerning the filing of the Request. 
Ms. Bancroft was not the person at the in-take desk who 
received the request for appointment of a pre-litigation 
panel. She cannot testify about what happened to the 
request after it was filed, unless she testifies that she 
knows what happened to the document in question. Without 
an affidavit from the person who did the in-take, there 
was no one to counter the affidavit of Thor B. Roundy 
stating that the document in question was filed. 
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There appears to be nothing contained in any procedure 
that Ms. Bancroft follows aimed at achieving the purpose 
of providing "other procedural changes to expedite early 
evaluation and settlement of claims." Instead, it 
appears that she sees the role of the Division as 
creating a process barrier to the subsequent filing of 
litigation. She has adopted her own personal policy for 
handling filings she considers incomplete. 
As another example, Utah Administrative Code R156-
78A-7(1) permits the Division to reject pleadings if they 
are not filed in accordance with the requirements of the 
rules promulgated under the Act. Utah Administrative 
Code, Rule R156-78A-9(2) addresses the division's 
discretion to reject a petition if it is not mailed to 
all healthcare providers named therein. In the present 
case, the Division never rejected the Plaintiffs' 
Request. The Division's failure to reject the Request 
constitutes the Division's acceptance and affirmation 
that the petition was acceptable and should have been 
processed appropriately. However, nothing contained in 
Rule R156-78A assures the existence of due process or 
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notice. The courts clearly recognize such provisions as 
essential to the just administration of claims. For 
example, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60, 
provides the court with broad discretion to address 
procedural oversights, whether caused by the courts or by 
the parties and their representatives. Without Rule 60, 
it would be very difficult to imagine the fair and 
equitable administration of the courts. 
Finally, there is clearly no provision in the rules 
which provides safeguards for lost filings, notice to 
claimants of the status of their matter, expectations of 
the Division with regard to delays or irregularities in 
processing, and so forth. The present case illustrates 
how the constitutional rights of claimants are violated 
by the absence of such provisions and/or the manner in 
which the Division has chosen to consciously ignore such 
rights in favor of limiting actions against health care 
providers instead of providing "other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." 
The trial court ignored the constitutional issues 
such as due process raised by the divisions' failure to 
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give the plaintiffs notice to the extent that there was a 
rejection of the Request. The trial court also ignored 
the failure of the Division to adopt and implement rules 
that achieved the legislative purpose of providing uother 
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims . " 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the appellants 
respectfully request that this Court issue an Order 
declaring the trial court to have jurisdiction over the 
action, and directing the trial court either to proceed 
with the litigation of the matter pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure or to order review by a 
prelitigation panel, with specific requirement that the 
plaintiffs be afforded appropriate due process remedies 
for the loss of the Request filed with the Division. 
DATED this J* day of July, 2002. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellants 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN PHILLIPS Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN DOES 1-50 Et al, 
Defendant. 
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ROBERT G WRIGHT 
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Video 
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HEARING 
This case is before the Court for oral argument on defendants' 
motions to dismiss. Appearances as shown above. 
Counsel present arguments to the Court. 
The matter is submitted. 
Based upon documents submitted, and arguments of counsel, the 
Court rules as follows: 
The Court will consider the motions' as Rule 56 motions in 
accordance with the rules of civil procedure, and consider the 
supporting documents in connection thereof. 
Based upon arguments of counsel, the Court finds a question of 
fact on the issue of file of a Pre-litigation Panel Request, the 
failure to pay filing fees is not dispositive. 
Plaintiff acknowledges their failure to to mail the request for 
Pre-litigation Panel to all the health care providers. 
Accordingly this Court has no jurisdiction, and the Court is 
compeled to dismiss the case, based upon failure to plaintiff to 
comply with the statute, and legislative mandate. 
Page 1 
Case No: 010905108 
Date: Dec 19, 2001 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, and an order consistent with the Court's 
ruling. 
Page 2 (last) 
JoAnn E. Carnahan (#5262) 
Paul D. Van Komen (#7332) 
BURBIDGE. CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE, 
Attorneys for Defendants McKay-Dee Hospital Center 
and Intermountain Health Care. Inc. 
1400 Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 359-7000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN LABELLE, SHEILA CARLSON, 
LINDA BUCKLEY and MARILYN 
PHILLIPS, individuals and as heirs of Norma 
Mary Harriman, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL CENTER, 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., 
Utah corporations, DR. IVAN D. WRIGHT, 
DR. HAROLD VONK and DR. RONALD S. 
RANKIN, individuals, and JOHN DOES 1-
50. 
Defendants 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 010905108 
Honorable Timothy Hanson 
The Court on December 19,2001 heard argument on the defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Thor B. Roundy; defendants McKay-
Dee Hospital Center and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. were represented by Paul D. Van 
Komen; Ivan D. Wright. M.D. was represented by Robert G. Wright; and defendants Harold 
Vonk. M.D. and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D. were represented by John David Ference. The Court, 
FILED 0ISTUCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB - 4 2002 
; . » SALTLARfil/COUNTY 
J 
CMputrClerfc 
having heard oral argument from counsel and having reviewed and considered the memoranda 
and affidavits submitted by the parties, finds as follows: 
1. Because matters outside the pleading were presented and considered by the Court, 
the motions to dismiss were treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56. 
2. The Court finds that a question of fact exists regarding whether a request for 
prelitigation panel review was 'Tiled" with the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
3. However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the plaintiffs nor their 
counsel complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for 
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and 
request/' In light of the plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of the health 
care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
which "'are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." 
4. The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no jurisdiction based on the 
legislative mandates set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
1 et seq. 
5. Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing 
litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because 
the plaintiffs* action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is 
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs* complaint. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs 
- ? . 
did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore the 
defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled action against the 
defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY DISMISSEE)/ 
DATED this v day of _ 
Timothy Hans< 
District Court 
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TITLE 78, CHAPTER 14 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
78-14-1. Short title of act. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act." 
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and 
the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially 
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance 
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care 
providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's 
practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a 
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide 
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse 
effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care system, it is 
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage 
private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance 
while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in 
the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable 
time in which actions may be commenced against health care providers while limiting that 
time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite 
early evaluation and settlement of claims. 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology under Title 58, 
Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act. 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a certified 
social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to practice chiropractic under 
Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act. 
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to practice as a clinical 
social worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section 
31A-2-102. 
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental hygiene as defined 
in Section 58-69-102. 
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in Section 
58-69-102. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created 
in Section 58-1-103. 
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, 
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of the 
judgment creditor. 
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which 
should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf 
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, 
corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders 
health care or professional services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical 
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric physician, 
psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical 
social worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family 
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and services 
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and 
officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in "the course and scope of their 
employment. 
(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution licensed under Title 26, 
Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection Act. 
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed to practice as a licensed 
practical nurse as provided in Section 58-31b-301. 
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a 
health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or 
otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(15) "Marriage and family therapist" means a person licensed to practice as a 
marriage therapist or family therapist under Section 58-60-405. 
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice naturopathy as 
defined in Section 58-71-102. 
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse 
midwife under Section 58-44a-302 or 58-44a-305. 
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice optometry under Title 58, 
Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry Practice Act. 
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice osteopathy under 
Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under 
a contract, express or implied. 
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy as provided in 
Section 58-17a-301. 
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy under 
Title 58, Chapter 24a, Physical Therapist Practice Act. 
*(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery under 
Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act. 
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to practice podiatry under Title 
58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric Physician Licensing Act. 
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician 
in this state under Title 58f Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act. 
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61, Psychologist 
Licensing Act, to practice psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102. 
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as 
provided in Section 58-31b-301. 
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, 
or other legal agent of the patient. 
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice as a social service 
worker under Section 58-60-305. 
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person Licensed to practice 
speech-language pathology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and 
Audiology Licensing Act. 
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or 
omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations - Exceptions - Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to 
exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, 
except that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that a 
foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred 
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object 
wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from 
discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, 
or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority 
or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and 
lall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and 
) all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care providers 
ised upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this 
:t; provided, however, that any action which under former law could have been commenced 
:ter the effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of 
.me allowed under former law; but any action which under former law could have been 
)mmenced more than four years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only 
.thin four years after the effective date of this act. 
1-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff 
No reduction where subrogation right exists - Collateral sources defined - Procedure to 
reserve subrogation rights - Evidence admissible - Exceptions. 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers as defined in Section 
1-14-3 in which damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the 
>urt shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid to the 
.aintiff from all collateral sources which are available to him; however, there shall be 
) reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in 
lis section nor shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the 
/ard of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of 
ict, the court shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts of collateral sources 
lich have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to 
.m. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has been paid, contributed, 
forfeited by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his immediate family to 
icure his right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his 
ijury, and shall offset any reduction in the award by such amounts. No evidence shall be 
iceived and no reduction made with respect to future collateral source benefits except as 
>ecified in Subsection (4). 
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to or for 
le benefit of the plaintiff for: 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States Social 
icurity Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other public 
ogram, except the federal programs which are required by law to seek subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident 
isurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any other 
milar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the plaintiff, 
lether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership, or 
>rporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or 
her health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, or 
sistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any 
her system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settlement 
judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 days before 
ttlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health care provider against 
om the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice shall state the name and 
dress of the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral sources paid, the 
mes and addresses of all persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for 
ich payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or benefits 
ailable in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available 
respective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood 
at such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also 
missible. The trier of fact may consider such evidence in determining the amount of 
mages awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of such 
nefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or entity as 
imbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, 
eluding any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, except to the extent that 
brogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as 
ovided in this section. All policies of insurance providing benefits affected by this 
ction are construed in accordance with this section. 
-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent - Proof required of patient - Defenses -
nsent to health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it shall 
be presumed that what the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly 
authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider in an 
action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must 
prove the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care 
provider; 
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient; 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered; 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of 
causing the patient serious harm; 
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk; 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented 
to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to 
the decision to give consent. In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the 
patient's position would do under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the 
viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided and "before the occurrence of any 
personal injuries alleged to have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of 
personal injuries suffered by the patient. 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care provider 
based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively 
minor; 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was 
commonly known to the public; 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, that he 
would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to 
pe informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed; 
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts and 
circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were 
disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably believed that additional disclosures 
could be expected to have a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which sets forth 
the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which contains a declaration that 
the patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, in hopes of 
obtaining desired beneficial results of health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a 
satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant 
risks have«been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his representative; 
such written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider based 
upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving 
the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the 
execution of the written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of 
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent any person 18 years 
of age or over from refusing to consent to health care for his own person upon personal or 
religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to consent to any health care 
not prohibited by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or 
not, for the minor under his care and any guardian for his ward; 
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for his or her parent who is unable by reason 
of age, physical or mental condition, to provide such consent; 
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over; 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with 
her pregnancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother or sister; and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grandchild. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or 
procedures for another as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liability. 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of result. 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged 
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be obtained from any 
health care rendered unless the guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set forth in 
writing and signed by the health care provider or an authorized agent of the provider. 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint. 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a 
malpractice action against a health care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for 
such damages as are reasonable in the premises. 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice actions. 
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may 
recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no 
case shall the amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000. This 
limitation does not affect awards of punitive damages. 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section 
78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seeking 
damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful death caused by 
the negligence of another which exceeds 331/3% of the amount recovered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, 
arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved. 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until 
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least 
ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a 
general statement of the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and 
place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on 
the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other 
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons and 
complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case 
notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be 
served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health care 
provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the 
applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health 
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as 
relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to 
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to third 
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care provider. 
78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers - Insurance commissioner 
nay require joint underwriting authority. 
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any 
Drofessional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not readily 
available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest requires, he may by 
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all 
insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and 
sickness policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a 
Drepaid or an expense incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical 
expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies. 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in malpractice actions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's damages for future medical 
:reatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
Dain and suffering. 
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money or delivery of other property to 
the judgment creditor at such intervals as ordered by the court. 
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider, as defined in Section 
78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of any party, order that future damages which 
equal or exceed $100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's fees and other costs which 
are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by periodic payments rather than by a lump 
sum payment. 
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of future damages by periodic 
payments, the court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between 
the sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future earnings shall be paid 
over the judgment creditor's work life expectancy. The court shall also order, when 
appropriate, that periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of 
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount of future damages, or as 
measured by the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and 
services. The present cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the fact finder's 
award of future damages, less any amount paid for attorney's fees and costs. The present 
cash value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting the total amount of 
periodic payments projected over the judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of 
interest which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future damages to present 
value, or the rate of interest available at the time of trial on one year U.S. Government 
Treasury Bills. Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered, the court shall 
require a judgment debtor to post security which assures full payment of those damages. 
Security for payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or more of the 
following forms: 
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer; 
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer; 
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more 
qualified insurers; 
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to guarantee payment of the 
judgment; or 
(e) any other form of security approved by the court. 
Security which complies with this section may also serve as a supersedeas bond, where 
one is required. 
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by periodic payments shall 
specify the recipient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, 
the interval between payments, and the niltnber of payments or the period of time over which 
payments shall be made. Those payments may only be modified m the event of the death of 
the judgment creditor. 
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the assignee of his obligation to 
make periodic payments, has failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it 
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the judgment debtor or his 
assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages caused by the failure to make payments, 
including .court costs and attorney's fees. 
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future damages, other than 
damages for loss of future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. 
Damages awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or payments terminated by 
reason of the death of the judgment creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the 
judgment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his 
death. In that case the court which rendered the original judgment may, upon petition of 
any party in interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future 
damages in accordance with this section. 
(1) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3), and approved by a final 
judgment entered under this section, the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the 
judgment debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be discharged. 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actions against health care 
providers which are brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are 
applicable; provided, however, that this act shall in no way affect the requirements for 
filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts 
recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive - Exception. 
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the provisions relating to the 
limitation on the time for commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, death or 
erv ices rendered which o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o the e f f e c t i v e da te of t h i s a c t . 
8-14-12. Div is ion to provide pane l - Exemption - Procedures - S ta tu te of l imitat ions 
o i l e d - Composition of panel - Expenses - D iv i s ion authorized t o s e t l i cense f ees . 
(1) (a) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l p r o v i d e a hear ing pane l in a l l e g e d medical l i a b i l i t y cases 
ga ins t hea l th care p r o v i d e r s a s d e f i n e d in Sec t ion 78-14-3 , excep t d e n t i s t s . 
(b) (i) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l e s t a b l i s h procedures for p r e l i t i g a t i o n considerat ion of 
ed ica l l i a b i l i t y claims for damages a r i s i n g out of t h e p r o v i s i o n of or al leged f a i l u r e to 
rovide hea l t h c a r e . 
( i i ) The d i v i s i o n may e s t a b l i s h r u l e s neces sa ry t o a d m i n i s t e r the process and 
rocedures r e l a t e d to p r e l i t i g a t i o n h e a r i n g s and the conduct of p r e l i t i g a t i o n hearings in 
ccordance with Sec t ions 78-14-12 th rough 78-14-16. 
(c) The proceedings a r e i n f o r m a l , nonbinding, and a re not s u b j e c t to T i t l e 63, 
hapter 4 6b, Admin i s t r a t ive P r o c e d u r e s Act , but a re compulsory as a condi t ion precedent t o 
ommencing l i t i g a t i o n . 
(d) Proceedings conducted under a u t h o r i t y of t h i s s e c t i o n a r e conf iden t i a l , 
r i v i l e g e d , and immune from c i v i l p r o c e s s . 
(2) (a) The pa r ty i n i t i a t i n g a medica l l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n s h a l l f i l e a reguest for 
r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review wi th t h e d i v i s i o n wi th in 60 days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of a 
t a t u t o r y n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o commence a c t i o n under Sec t ion 7 8 - 1 4 - 8 . 
(b) The reques t s h a l l i n c l u d e a copy of the n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o commence ac t i on . The 
squest s h a l l be mailed t o a l l h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r s named in t h e n o t i c e and reques t . 
(3) (a) The f i l i n g of a r e q u e s t fo r p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel rev iew under t h i s sec t ion 
o i l s the app l i cab l e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s u n t i l t h e e a r l i e r of 60 days following the 
i v i s i o n ' s i ssuance of an o p i n i o n by t h e p r e l i t i g a t i o n pane l , or 60 days following the 
srmination of j u r i s d i c t i o n by t h e d i v i s i o n as p rov ided in t h i s s u b s e c t i o n . The d i v i s i o n 
l a l l send any opinion i s s u e d by t h e pane l t o a l l p a r t i e s by r e g u l a r ma i l . 
(b) (i) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l complete a p r e l i t i g a t i o n hea r ing under t h i s 
action wi th in 180 days a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of the r e q u e s t for p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel review, or 
Lthin any longer pe r iod as a g r e e d upon in w r i t i n g by a l l p a r t i e s t o the review. 
( i i ) If the p r e l i t i g a t i o n hea r ing has not been completed within the time 
Lmits e s t a b l i s h e d in Subsec t ion (3) (b) ( i ) , the d i v i s i o n has no f u r t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
le mat ter sub jec t t o review and t h e c l a iman t i s cons ide red t o have complied with a l l 
Dnditions precedent r e q u i r e d under t h i s s e c t i o n p r i o r t o the commencement of l i t i g a t i o n . 
(c) (i) The c l a iman t and any respondent may agree by w r i t t e n s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t 
:> useful purpose would be s e r v e d by convening a p r e l i t i g a t i o n pane l under t h i s s e c t i o n . 
( i i ) When the s t i p u l a t i o n i s f i l e d with t h e d i v i s i o n , t he d iv i s ion s h a l l 
Lthin ten days a f t e r r e c e i p t e n t e r an o rde r d i v e s t i n g i t s e l f of j u r i s d i c t i o n over the 
Laim, as i t concerns the s t i p u l a t i n g responden t , and s t a t i n g t h a t the claimant has 
implied with a l l cond i t i ons p r e c e d e n t t o t he commencement of l i t i g a t i o n regarding the 
Laim. 
(4) The d i v i s i o n s h a l l p r o v i d e for and appoint an a p p r o p r i a t e panel or panels to hear 
>mplaints of medical l i a b i l i t y and damages, made by or on b e h a l f of any pa t i en t whc i s an 
Lleged v ic t im of medical l i a b i l i t y . The pane l s a r e composed of: 
(a) one member who i s a r e s i d e n t lawyer c u r r e n t l y l i c e n s e d and in good standing to 
rac t ice law in t h i s s t a t e and who s h a l l s e rve as chairman of t h e pane l , who i s appointed 
r the d i v i s i o n from among q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s who have r e g i s t e r e d with the d iv i s ion 
id ica t ing a w i l l i ngnes s t o s e r v e a s pane l members, and a w i l l i n g n e s s to comply with the 
l ies of p r o f e s s i o n a l conduct gove rn ing lawyers in t h e s t a t e of Utah, and who has 
>mpleted d i v i s i o n t r a i n i n g r e g a r d i n g conduct of pane l h e a r i n g s ; 
(b) (i) one member who i s a l i c e n s e d h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r l i s t e d under Section 
1-14-3, who i s p r a c t i c i n g and knowledgeable in the same s p e c i a l t y as the proposed 
jfendant, and who i s appo in ted by t h e d i v i s i o n in accordance wi th Subsection (5); or 
( i i ) in claims a g a i n s t o n l y h o s p i t a l s or t h e i r employees, one member who i s an 
idividual c u r r e n t l y s e rv ing i n a h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p o s i t i o n d i r e c t l y r e l a t ed t o 
>spital ope ra t ions or conduct t h a t i n c l u d e s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e area of p r ac t i ce t h a t 
i the subjec t of the l i a b i l i t y c l a i m , and who i s appo in ted by t h e d i v i s i o n ; and 
(c) a lay p a n e l i s t who i s no t a lawyer , doc to r , h o s p i t a l employee, or other hea l th 
ire provider , and who i s a r e s p o n s i b l e c i t i z e n of t h e s t a t e , s e l e c t e d and appointed by 
le d iv i s i on from among i n d i v i d u a l s who have completed d i v i s i o n t r a i n i n g with respect t o 
mel hea r ings . 
(5) (a) Each person l i s t e d a s a h e a l t h ca re p r o v i d e r in S e c t i o n 78-14-3 and 
a c t i c i n g under a l i c e n s e i s s u e d by t h e s t a t e , i s o b l i g a t e d as a condi t ion of holding 
iat l i c e n s e to p a r t i c i p a t e as a member of a medical l i a b i l i t y p r e l i t i g a t i o n panel a t 
asonable t imes , p l a c e s , and i n t e r v a l s , upon i s s u a n c e , with advance no t i ce given in a 
reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to Participate as a Medical Liability 
Prelitigation Panel Member. 
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and participation as a panel member 
upon the division finding participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable burden 
or hardship upon the licensee. 
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear and participate as a panel 
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or justification and without being 
excused for cause by the division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to exceed 
$5,000. 
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or repeatedly failed to appear 
and participate as a panel member when so ordered, without adequate explanation or 
justification and without being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed an 
administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5) (c) and (d) shall be deposited in the 
Physicians Education Account created in Section 58-67a-l. 
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he has no 
bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration. 
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation 
and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of the division. 
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care 
providers, the division may set license fees of health care providers within the limits 
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation 
panels. 
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel 
except under Section 78-14-16. 
78-14-13. Proceedings - Authority of panel - Rights of parties to proceedings. 
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and 
exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, 
and exhibits at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or witnesses 
who provided the evidence. 
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records directly related to the 
claim of medical liability in accordance with division rule and in compliance with the 
following: 
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting party in proper form for 
issuance by the division; and 
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by: 
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting the subpoena attesting to the 
fact the medical record subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related to the 
medical liability claim to which the subpoena is related; or 
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to be provided to the person 
requesting the subpoena, signed by the individual who is the subject of the medical record 
or by that individual's guardian or conservator. 
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the 
conduct of prelitigation panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related tc 
subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including witness fees and mileage. 
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. 
There is no discovery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special 
order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. 
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate in 
the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of the 
parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to the public. 
(b) No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary 
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, 
request special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular 
respects. 
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of the 
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other parties. 
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter for 
panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of a request. 
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel. 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel - No judicial or other review. 
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days after the end of 
the proceedings. The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidence whether each clair 
ainst each health care provider has merit or has no merit and, if meritorious, whether 
e conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant. 
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or 
commendations. 
-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action - Panelist may not 
compelled to testify - Immunity of panelist from civil liability - Information 
garding professional conduct. 
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and its 
suits, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an 
tion subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with 
gard to the subject matter of the panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil 
ability-arising from participation as a panelist and for all communications, findings, 
inions, and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties prescribed by this 
stion. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit the division from 
nsidering any information contained in a statutory notice of intent to commence action, 
guest for prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with respect to the 
/ision's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct. 
-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of 
rties - Compensation to members of panel. 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding 
titration hearing and proceed under Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of 
3 panel, which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the proceeding is 
isidered an arbitration proceeding, the parties are equally responsible for compensation 
the members of the panel for services rendered. 
-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a 
ilth care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) 
re not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the folowing 
:ormation on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the 
lim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected 
ier the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any for arbitration-related costs under the 
•eement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still 
:eive health care; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is 
iceled in writing before the renewal date; and 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement 
;wered; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator shall be collectively selected by all persons claiming damages 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the 
lth care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or 
leral courts of Utah; 
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear before a 
ring panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 30 days of 
ning the agreement; and 
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be 
omatically renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient 
health care provider before the renewal date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care of any 
on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (5) refused to 
er into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal explanation 
of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a 
defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal explanation of 
the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient; 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; 
or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was 
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent omission to state material fats. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a 
binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a 
person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration 
agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
>. Commerce, Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
5-78A. Prelitigation Panel Review Rules, 
5-78A-1. Title. 
These rules are known as the "Prelitigation Panel Review Rules". 
5-78A-2. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Section 78-14-3, which shall apply to these rules: 
(1) "Answer" means a responsive answer to a request. 
(2) "Director" means the Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
snsing. 
(3) "Meritorious claim" means that there is a basis in fact and law to conclude 
the standard of care has been breached and the petitioner has been injured thereby, 
that the petitioner has a reasonable expectation of prevailing at trial. 
(4) "Motion" means a request for any action or relief permitted under Sections 78-
.2 through 78-14-16 or these rules. 
(5) "Nonmeritorious claim" means that the evidence before the panel is insufficient 
ronclude that the case is meritorious, but does not necessarily mean the case is 
rolous. 
(6) "Notice" means a notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. 
(7) "Panel" means the prelitigation panel appointed in accordance with Subsection 
4-12(4) to review a request. 
(8) "Party" means a petitioner or respondent. 
(9) "Person" means any natural person, sole proprietorship, joint venture, 
•oration, limited liability company, association, governmental subdivision or agency, 
organization of any type. 
*(10) "Petitioner" means any person who files a request with the division. 
(11) "Pleadings" include the requests, answers, motions, briefs and any other 
ments filed by the parties to a request. 
(12) "Request" means a request for prelitigation panel review under Section 78-14-
(13) "Respondent" means any health care provider named in a request. 
-78A-3. Authority - Purpose. 
These rules are adopted by the division under the authority of Subsection 78-14-
)(b) to define, clarify, and establish the process and procedures which govern 
itigation panel reviews. 
-78A-4. General Provisions. 
(1) Liberal Construction. 
These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and economical 
rmination of all issues presented to the division. 
(2) Deviation from Rules. 
The division may permit a deviation from these rules insofar as it may find 
liance therewith to be impractical or unnecessary. 
(3) Computation of Time. 
The time within which any act shall be done, as herein provided, shall be computed 
xcluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday, Sunday 
state holiday, and then it is excluded and the period runs until the end of the next 
which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a holiday. When the period of time prescribed 
llowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays 
1 be excluded in the computation. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do 
act within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him 
the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, three" days shall be added to the 
bribed period. 
-78A-5. Representations - Appearances. 
(1) Representation of Parties. 
A party may represent himself individually, or if not an individual, may represent 
Lf through an officer or employee, or may be represented by counsel. 
(2) Entry of Appearance of Representation. 
Parties shall promptly enter their appearances by giving their names and addresses 
stating their positions or interests in the proceeding. When possible, appearances 
L be entered in writing concurrently with the filing of the request for petitioner and 
iter than 10 days from service of the request for respondent. 
R156-78A-6. Pleadings. 
(1) Docket Number and Title. 
Upon receipt of a timely Request for Prelitigation Review, the division shall assign 
a two letter code identifying the matter as involving this type of request (PR) , a two 
digit code indicating the year the request was filed, a two digit code indicating the 
month the request was filed, and another number indicating chronological position among 
requests filed during the month. The division shall give the matter a title in 
substantially the following form: 
TABLE I 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
John Doe, 
Petitioner Request for 
Pre l i t igat ion Review 
-vs-
Richard Roe, No. PR-XX-XX-XXX 
Respondent 
(2) Form and Content of Pleadings. 
"Pleadings must be double-spaced and typewritten and presented on standard 8 1/2" x 
11" white paper. They must identify the proceeding by title and docket number, if known, 
and shall contain a clear and concise statement of the matter relied upon as a basis for 
the pleading, together with an appropriate prayer for relief when relief is sought. A 
request shall, by affirmation, set forth the date that the required notice was served, 
shall include a copy of the notice and shall reflect service of the request upon all 
parties named in the notice and request. When a petitioner fails to attach a copy of the 
notice to petitioner's request, the division shall return the request to the petitioner 
with a written notice of incomplete request and conditional denial thereof. The notice 
shall advise the petitioner that his request is incomplete and that the request is denied 
unless the petitioner corrects the deficiency within the time period specified in the 
notice and otherwise meets all qualifications to have the request granted. 
(3) Signing of Pleadings. 
Pleadings shall be signed by the party or their counsel of record and shall indicate 
the addresses of the party and, if applicable, their counsel of record. The signature 
shall be deemed to be a certification that the signer has read the pleading and that, to 
the best of his knowledge and belief, there is good ground to support it. 
(4) Answers. 
A respondent named in a request may file an answer relative to the merits set forth 
in the petitioner's notice. Affirmative defenses shall be separately stated and numbered 
in an answer or raised at the time of the hearing. Any answer must be filed no later than 
15 days following the filing of the request. 
(5) Motions. 
(a) Motions to be Filed in Writing. 
Motions shall be in writing unless the motion could not have been anticipated prior 
to the prelitigation panel hearing. 
(b) Time Periods for Filing Motions and Responding Thereto, 
(i) Motions to Withdraw a Request. 
Any motion to withdraw a request shall be filed no later than five days before the 
prelitigation panel hearing. 
(ii) Motions Directed Toward a Request. 
Any motion directed toward a request shall be filed no later than 15 days after 
service of the request. 
(iii) Motions Directed Toward the Composition of a Panel. 
Any motion directed toward the composition of a panel shall be filed no later than 
five days after discovering a basis therefore. 
(iv) Motions to Dismiss. 
Any motion to dismiss shall be filed no later than five days after discovering a 
basis therefore. 
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(v) Extraordinary Motions for Discovery or Perpetuation of Evidence. 
Any motion seeking discovery or perpetuation of evidence for good cause shown 
Tionstrating extraordinary circumstances shall be filed no later than 15 days before the 
slitigation panel hearing. 
(vi) Response to a Motion. 
A response to a motion shall be filed no later than five days after service of the 
tion and any final reply shall be filed no later than five days after service of the 
sponse to the motion. 
(c) Affidavits and Memoranda. 
The division or panel shall permit and may require affidavits and memoranda, or 
:h, in support or contravention of a motion. 
(d) The division or panel may permit or require oral argument on a motion. 
56-78A-7. Filing and Service. 
(1) Filing of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be filed with the division with 
rvice thereof to all parties named in the notice. The division may refuse to accept 
ladings if they are not filed in accordance with the requirements of these rules. 
(2) Service. Pleadings and documents issued by the division or panel shall be 
rved either by personal service or by first class mail. Personal service shall be made 
>n a party in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by any peace officer 
:hin the State of Utah or by any person specifically designated by the division. When 
attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of any party, service upon that attorney 
istitutes service upon the party so represented. 
(3) Proof of Service. There shall appear on all documents required to be served a 
rtificate of service in substantially the following form: 
TABLE II 
I hereby cer t i fy that I have t h i s day served the foregoing document upon the part ies 
record in th i s proceeding set forth below (by de l iver ing a copy thereof in person ) (by 
ling a copy thereof, properly addressed by f i r s t c lass mail) : 
(Name of pa r t i e s of record) 
(addresses) 
Dated th i s (day) day of (month) , (year) . 
(Signature) 
(Title) 
6-78A-8. Panel Selection and Compensation. 
(1) The division shall commence the selection and appointment of panel members 
lowing the issuance of a notice of hearing pursuant to these rules. 
(2) The selection and appointment of panel members shall.be in accordance with 
sections 78-14-12(4) and (5). 
(3) (a) In accordance with Subsection 78-14-12(4), whenever multiple respondents 
identified in a request, the division shall select and appoint a panel to sit in 
sideration of all claims against any respondent as follows: 
(i) one lawyer member who is the chairman in accordance with Subsection 78-14-
4) (a); 
(ii) one lay panelist member in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12(4) (c) ; 
(iii) one licensed health care provider who is practicing and knowledgeable for 
h specialty represented by the respondents in accordance with Subsection 78-14-
4)(b)(i); and 
(iv) if a hospital or their employees are named as a respondent, one member who is 
individual currently serving in a hospital administration position directly related to 
pital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that 
the subject of the liability claim, in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12 (4) (b) (ii) . 
(b) The distinction between a hospital administrator and a person serving in a 
Dital administration position referenced "in Subsection 78-14-12(4) (b) (ii) is 
lificant and is hereby emphasized. 
(c) The person serving in a hospital administration position referenced in 
section 78-14-12(4)(b)(ii) shall be from a different facility than the facility which 
;he subject of the alleged medical liability case, but may be from the same umbrella 
organization provided the panel member certifies under oath that he is free from bias or 
conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration as required by 
Subsection 78-14-12(6). 
(d) Petitioner and respondent may stipulate concerning the type of health care 
provider to be selected and appointed by the division, unless the stipulation is in 
violation with the panel composition requirements set forth in Subsection 78-14*12(4) (b) . 
(4) Upon stipulation of all parties, a motion to evaluate damages may be submitted 
to the division whereupon the division may appoint an additional panel member to assist in 
evaluating damages. 
(5) The division shall ensure that panelists possess all qualifications required by 
statute and these rules. 
(6) Upon appointment to a prelitigation panel, each member thereof shall sign a 
written affirmation in substantially the following form: 
TABLE III 
I, (panel member), hereby affirm that, as a member of a prelitigation panel, I will 
iischarge my responsibilities without bias towards any party. I also affirm that, to the 
best of my knowledge, no conflict of interest exists as to any matter which will be 
sntrusted to my consideration as a panel member. 
Dated this (day) day of (month) , (year) . 
(Signature) 
(7) Panel members shall be entitled to per diem compensation and travel expenses 
according to a schedule as established and published by the division. 
R156-78A-9. Action upon Request - Scheduling Procedures - Continuances. 
(1) Action upon Request. 
Upon receiving a request, the division shall issue an order approving or denying the 
request. 
(2) Criteria for Approving or Denying a Request. 
The criteria for approving or denying a request shall be whether: 
(a) the request is timely filed in accordance with Subsection 78-14-12(2) (a); 
(b) the request includes a copy of the notice in accordance with Subsection 78-14-
12(2) (b) ; and 
(c) the request has been mailed to all health care providers named in the notice 
and request as required by Subsection 78-14-2(2) (b) . 
(3) Legal Effect of Denial of Request. 
The denial of a request restarts the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations until an appropriate request is filed with the division. 
(4) Scheduling Procedures. 
(a) If a request is approved, the order approving the request shall direct the 
party who made the request to contact all parties named in the request and notice to 
iqtermine by agreement of the parties: 
(i) what type of health care provider panelists are requested; 
(ii) at least two dates acceptable to all parties on which a prelitigation panel 
hearing may be scheduled; and 
(iii) whether or not the case will be submitted in accordance with Section R156-
78A-13 and if so, the nature of the submission. 
(b) The order shall direct the party who made the request to file the scheduling 
information with the division, on forms available from the division, no later than 20 days 
following the issuance of the order. 
(c) If the party so directed fails to comply with the directive without good cause, 
the division shall schedule the hearing without further input from the party. 
(d) No later than five days following the filing of the approved form, the division 
shall issue a notice of hearing setting a date, time and a place for the prelitigation 
panel hearing. No hearing shall take place within the 35 day period immediately following 
the filing of a Request for Prelitigation Review, unless the parties and the division 
consent to a shorter period of time. 
(e) The division shall thereafter promptly select and appoint a panel in accordance 
with Subsections 78-14-12(4) and (5) and these rules. 
(5) Continuances, 
(a) Standard. 
In order t o preva i l on a motion for a continuance the moving party must e s t a b l i s h : 
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(i) that the motion was filed no later than five days after discovering the 
cessity for the motion and at least two days before the scheduled hearing; 
(ii) that extraordinary facts and circumstances unknown and uncontrollable by the 
rty at the time the hearing date was established justify a continuance; 
(iii) that the rights of the other parties, the division, and the panel will not be 
fairly prejudiced if the hearing is continued; and 
(iv) that a continuance will serve the best interests of the goals and objectives 
the prelitigation panel review process. 
(b) If a continuance is granted, the order shall direct the party who requested the 
ntinuance to contact all parties named in the request and notice to establish no less 
an two dates acceptable to all parties, on which the prelitigation panel hearing may be 
scheduled. 
(c) The order shall direct the party who requested the continuance to file the 
tieduling information with the division, on forms approved by the division, no later than 
\re days following the issuance of the order. 
(d) If a party so directed is the petitioner and the petitioner fails to comply 
th the directive without good cause, the division shall dismiss the request without 
sjudice. Upon issuance of the order of dismissal by the division, the applicable 
atute of limitations on the cause of action shall no longer be tolled. The petitioner 
all be required to file another request prior to the scheduling of any further 
Dceeding and, until this request is filed, the statute of limitations shall continue to 
a. 
(e) If a party so directed is the respondent and the respondent fails to comply 
th the directive without good cause, the division shall establish a date for the 
^litigation panel hearing acceptable to petitioner and disallow any further motions for 
itinuances from respondent. 
(f) No later than three days following the filing of the dates, the division shall 
sue a notice of hearing resetting a date, time and a place for the prelitigation panel 
aring. 
S6-78A-10. Consequences of Failure to Appear at a Scheduled Hearing. 
(1) Except as provided by Section R156-78A-13: 
(a) If a party or a representative appointed by the party fails to appear for a 
iring without good cause after due notice has been provided as to the scheduling of the 
nring, the hearing shall proceed in the party's absence and the party shall lose the 
jht to present any further evidence to the panel. 
(b) If neither party nor their representatives appear for a hearing without good 
ise after due notice has been provided as to the scheduling of the hearing, the division 
ill dismiss the request without prejudice. The dismissal shall terminate the tolling of 
* applicable statute of limitations under Subsection 78-14-12(3). 
>6-78A-ll. Prehearing Procedure. 
The division may, upon written notice to all parties of record, schedule a 
shearing conference with the panel for the purposes of formulating or simplifying the 
sues, obtaining admissions of fact and genuineness of documents which will avoid 
lecessary proof, and agreeing to other matters as may expedite the orderly conduct of . 
i proceedings or the settlement thereof. Agreements reached during the conference shall 
recorded in an appropriate order unless the parties enter into a written stipulation on 
i matters or agree to a statement thereof made on the record by the chairman of the 
iel. 
16-78A-12. Hearing Procedures. 
(1) Hearings Closed to the Public. 
All hearings are closed to the public. 
(2) Attendance of Panel Members. 
Except where a case is submitted in written form in accordance with Section R156-
13, all panel members appointed shall be present during the entire hearing. 
(3) Order of Presentation of Evidence. 
Unless otherwise directed by the panel at the hearing, the order of procedure and 
sentation of evidence will be as follows: 
(a) Petitioner; 
(b) Re spondent; and 
(c) Petitioner, if the panel permits petitioner to present rebuttal evidence. 
(4) Method of Presentation of Evidence. 
Evidence may be presented by any party on a narrative basis or through direct 
examination or said party by their counsel of record. The panel may make inquiry of any 
party pertinent to the issues to be addressed. If a motion to evaluate damages has been 
granted, the panel may properly take evidence as to that issue. As set forth in Section 
78-14-13, no party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary 
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, 
request special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular 
respects, including oral argument, evidentiary rebuttal, or submission of briefs. 
(5) Rules of Evidence. 
Formal rules of evidence are not applicable. Any relevant evidence may be admitted 
if it is the type of evidence commonly relied upon by prudent people in the conduct of 
their affairs. The panel shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law. 
Irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. 
(6) Burden of Proof. 
The petitioner shall be responsible for establishing a meritorious claim against any 
respondent, and if the issue of damages is presented, the amount of damages. 
(7) Standard of Proof. 
The standard of proof for prelitigation hearings is a preponderance of the evidence. 
(8) Use of Evidence. 
Use of evidence, documents, and exh ib i t s submitted t o a panel s h a l l be in accordance 
with Subsect ion 78-14-13(1) and Section 78-14-14. 
(9) Record of Hearing. 
On its own motion, the panel may record the proceeding for the sole purpose of 
assisting the panel in its subsequent deliberation and issuance of an opinion. The record 
may be made by means of tape recorder or other recording device. No tape recorder or 
other device shall be used by anyone otherwise present during the proceeding to record the 
matter. Upon issuance by the panel of its opinion, the record of the proceeding shall be 
destroyed. 
(10) Subpoenas and Fees. 
(a) Issuance of Subpoenas. 
The division may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production 
of medical records in accordance with Subsection 78-14-13(2) and (3). However, except as 
permitted by Subsection 78-14-13(2) and (3) and in accordance with Subsection 78-14-13(4), 
there is not discovery or perpetuation of testimony in prelitigation panel hearings, 
except upon special order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating 
extraordinary circumstances. 
(b) Payment of Witness Fees. 
A subpoenaed witness who appears for a prelitigation panel review shall be entitled 
to witness fees and mileage to be paid by the requesting party. Witnesses shall receive 
the same fee and mileage allowed by law to witnesses in a district court. A witness 
subpoenaed by a party may, at the time of service of the subpoena, demand one day's 
witness fee and mileage in advance and unless the fee is tendered, the witness shall not 
be required to appear. 
R156-78A-13. Submission of Case in Written Form, by Proffer, or a Combination thereof -
Requirements. 
(1) A full prelitigation panel hearing is not required if the parties enter into a 
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by convening a panel hearing as to any 
or all respondents or if the parties agree to submit their case as to any or all 
respondents to the panel in written form, by proffer of evidence, or by a combination 
thereof. 
(2) Any case submitted in writing must include a legal argument addressing the 
relevant evidence and law with regard to the issues presented in the case. 
R156-78A-14. Determination - Supplemental Opinion - Certificate of Compliance. 
(1) Panel Determination. 
As soon as is reasonably practicable following the conclusion of a hearing or 
submission of a case to the panel in accordance with Section R156-78A-13, and, if 
applicable, submission of briefs by the parties, the panel shall file with the division a 
determination whether any claim against any respondent is meritorious. If applicable, the 
determination shall also reflect the panel's evaluation of the damages sustained by the 
petitioner. 
(2) Supplementary Memorandum Opinion. 
Within 30 days after filing its determination, the panel shall file a memorandum 
opinion explaining the panel's determination. The chairman of the panel shall be 
responsible for the preparation of the memorandum opinion of the panel, but may delegate 
6 
initial preparation of the opinion to another member of the panel. 
(3) Certificate of Compliance. 
Within 15 days after receiving the panel's memorandum opinion, the director shall 
le a certificate of compliance which recites that petitioner has fully complied with 
requirements of Section 78-14-12. With respect to the tolling of the statute of 
stations referenced in Section 78-14-12(3), the 60 day time period mentioned therein 
L1 begin to run as of the date the Director causes the certificate of compliance to be 
red, the three day mailing period set forth in Section R156-78A-4 (3) to be applied. 
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